Coal bunker fire theory

Since the time of the explosion in 1898, many advocates stating that an internal explosion had sunk the Maine based their conclusion on the coal bunker fire theory. Supporters of this theory believe that spontaneous combustion of the coal in bunker A16 created a fire that detonated the nearby magazines. Spontaneous combustion of coal was a fairly frequent problem on ships built after the American Civil War. This type of fire occurs when the surfaces of freshly broken coal are exposed to air. The coal surface oxidizes, producing heat. When the coal reaches a temperature of about 180 degrees, the coal will begin to burn. The heat from the fire could have transferred to the magazines, which would have triggered the explosion.

Spontaneous combustion was not an uncommon problem on ships built in the latter part of the 19th century. Several ships sustained damage during the Spanish-American War when the bituminous coal in their bunkers ignited. These fires were difficult to detect because they could smolder for hours at low heat, giving off no smoke or flame or raising the temperature high enough to trigger the alarm systems on board these ships. Reports indicate that the last time bunker A16 had been inspected was at 8:00 a.m. on February 15, so there was ample time for a coal bunker fire to smolder into a disaster.

However, several problems exist with the coal bunker fire theory. The Maine never had an instance of spontaneous combustion on board, as did so many other ships of that time, and out of all the ships that had experienced spontaneous combustion, none was reported to have sustained serious damage. The type of coal carried by the Maine was New River coal, which is classified as low volatile bituminous coal and was not generally known to spontaneously combust. Bunker A16 was not situated by a boiler or any other external heat source, and normally spontaneous combustion does not occur unless there is a heat source to speed up the process. When Bunker A16 was inspected the morning of the disaster, the temperature was only 59 degrees Fahrenheit, and the Maine's oversensitive temperature sensor system did not indicate any dangerous rise in temperature. The discipline on the Maine was excellent, and regular inspections of coal bunkers for hazards, as well as the implementation of precautions for preventing bunker fires, were diligently carried out under the supervision of the cautious executive officer of the Maine, Richard Wainwright. These idiosyncrasies related to the coal bunker fire theory are what give rise to the constant debate of this argument’s legitimacy.

The investigations

Four major investigations have been conducted to find the actual cause of the sinking of the Maine. Two Naval Courts of Inquiry were held in 1898 and 1911, and two major private investigations commissioned by Admiral Hyman G. Rickover in 1976 and the National Geographic in 1999, all revealed different conclusions. The debates on the sinking of the Maine rest on evidence uncovered through these four investigations.

Immediately after the sinking in 1898, President William McKinley ordered a naval inquiry into what caused the Maine to explode. This 1898 Court of Inquiry headed by Captain William T. Sampson began its work on February 21. Survivors and eyewitnesses testified for the court, and several navy divers explored the sunken ship, hoping to find clues as to what may have caused the disaster. The Sampson Board concluded that the Maine had been blown up by a mine, which in turn caused the explosion of her forward magazines. The official report from the board, which was presented to the Navy Department in Washington on March 25, specifically stated that, “The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons.” This, of course, did not stop the U.S. from pinning the destruction on the Spanish, and war was declared one month later.

1911 Court of Inquiry

By 1908, the war drums had long stopped beating, and many parties demanded that the Maine be raised from Havana Harbor. Cuban officials became worried about the safety of having a sunken ship in their harbor, U.S. officials wanted the remains of the sailors trapped in the wreck recovered and buried, and everyone wanted to confirm the cause of the sinking. The Maine was raised in December 1910, and a Court of Inquiry headed by Rear Admiral Charles E. Vreeland went to work. Sections of the hull of the Maine were numbered, many photographs were taken, and models of the Maine and her wreckage were built. The conclusions of the Vreeland Board differed with the Sampson Board only in detail. The Vreeland Board stated that the explosion of the magazines was triggered by an external blast, but the damage to the Maine was much more extensive than the Sampson Board had thought. It was also concluded that the blast occurred further aft on the ship, and a lower powered explosive caused the damage than was originally established. After the investigation, the dead were buried in Arlington National Cemetery and the wreck of the Maine was scuttled at sea.